(August 10-13, 2015 – Universidad Austral)

PROGRAM

Monday 10	Tuesday 11	Wednesday 12	Thursday 13
Seminar “Salud mental y libertad”, Dr. Juan José Sanguineti, Università della Santa Croce, Italia Dr. Pascual Ángel Gargiulo, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Argentina 9.30 – 13.00 HS 15:30 – 18:30 HS	Conference “El problema mente-cuerpo y la idea de hombre” Dr. Carlos Blanco, Universidad Pontificia Comillas, España 9.30 HS	Conference “¿La palabra ‘conciencia’, siuge haciendo reír a los psicólogos?” Dr. José Ahumada, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina 11.00 HS	Workshop 11 – 17 HS
	Workshop 11.30 – 17.30 HS	Workshop 11.30 – 17.30 HS

Workshop

First day: Philosophy of science. Philosophy asks Neurosciences

1. How do the different epistemological levels of cognitive sciences, psychology and the neurosciences relate to each other? Do neurobiological descriptions and explanations offer a determinist or an indeterminist picture?

Bibliography:
R. N. McCAULEY, “Reduction: Models of cross-scientific relations and their implications for the psychology-neuroscience interface”, in P. THAGARD, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, North-Holland: Elsevier, 2007, pp. 105-158.

W. GLANNON, “Our Brains Are not Us”, in Brain, Body, and Mind. Neuroethics with a Human Face, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 11-39.

2. Is an epistemological or a semantic dualism between the mental and the neural viable without some kind of ontological duality, such as that of mind and body?

Bibliography:
P. RICOEUR & J.-P. CHANGEUX, Lo que nos hace pensar, Barcelona: Península, 1999, pp. 9-75; 171-180.

D. ROBINSON, “Still Looking: Science and Philosophy in Pursuit of Prince Reason”, in M. BENNETT, P. HACKER, D. DENNETT & J. SEARLE, Neuroscience and Philosophy. Brain, Mind and Language, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 171-193.

 

Second day: Philosophy of the Neurosciences. Neurosciences ask Philosophy

3. Can the framework of a complex nature be a condition for a non-reductionist mental causation open to human free choices? In this sense, could the notion of downward causation as selection from stochastic processes of a lower level be helpful?

Bibliography:
J. KIM, “Causation and mental causation”, in P. McLAUGHLIN & J. COHEN, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 2007, pp. 227-242.

N. MURPHY, “Avoiding neurobiological reductionism: the role of downward causation in complex systems”, in J. J. SANGUINETI, A. ACERBI & J. A. LOMBO (eds.), Moral Behavior and Free Will. A Neurobiological and Philosophical Approach. Vatican City: IF Press, 2011, pp. 200-222.

4.Are random neurobiological processes compatible with the setting of goals, especially by a voluntary agent? Is it possible to talk about finality and free will within an indeterminist framework?

Bibliography:
B. LIBET, “Do we have free will?”, in R. Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005, pp. 552-564.

M. BALAGUER, “Why the compatibilism issue and conceptual-analysis issue are metaphysically irrelevant?”, in Free will as an Open Scientific Problem, Cambridge-MA: MIT Press, 2010, pp. 25-54.

J. J. SANGUINETI, “Can free decisions be both intentional and neural operations?”, in J. J. SANGUINETI, A. ACERBI & J. A. LOMBO (eds.), Moral Behavior and Free Will. A Neurobiological and Philosophical Approach, Vatican City: IF Press, 2011, pp. 149-168.

Third day: Neurosciences & Religion. Neurosciences ask Religion

5. Is the human mind an emergent property of super-complex neural systems? Is it possible to speak about a human soul in a neurobiological account?

Bibliography:
P. CLAYTON, “Neuroscience, the person and God: An emergentist account”, in R. J. RUSSELL, N. MURPHY, T. C. MEYERING & M. a. ARBIB (eds.), Neuroscience and the Persons: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, Berkeley: Vatican Observatory Foundation, 2002, pp. 181-214.

V. G. STARRATT & T. K, SHACKELFORD, “The basics components of the human mind were solidified during the Pleistocene epoch”, in F. J. AYALA & R. ARP, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 231-242.

6.Is it possible to distinguish between free will and freedom? Is the concept of personal freedom compatible with neuroscientific inquiry or does it require a different kind of approach?

Bibliography:
J. A. GARCÍA GONZÁLEZ, “Autognosis y conocimiento de Dios: el acceso a Dios desde la persona humana”, Studia Poliana (2012) 14, pp. 55-82.

R. SCRUTON, The Face of God. The Gifford Lectures 2010, London-New York: Continuum, 2010, pp. 21-49.

 

Speakers who have confirmed their participation: Mariano Asla (Universidad Austral, Argentina); Carlos Blanco (Universidad de Navarra, Spain); Pablo Brumowsky (Universidad Austral, Argentina); Luis Echarte (Universidad de Navarra, Spain); Juan Francisco Franck (Universidad Austral, Argentina); Miguel García Valdecasas (Universidad de Navarra, Spain); Juan Pablo Roldán (Universidad Católica Argentina, Argentina); Juan José Sanguineti (Pontificia Università della Santa Croce, Italy); Ángela Suburo (Universidad Austral, Argentina); José Ignacio Murillo (Universidad de Navarra, Spain); Marcelo Villar (Universidad Austral, Argentina).